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WHAT TYPES OF STATEMENTS ARE THERE? 
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Abstract:
We have argued that premise acceptability, broadly speaking, amounts to there being a
presumption in favor of the premise. We have also argued that presumption is dependent on the
sources which have vouched for a statement. We have further claimed that whether a source's
vouching for a statement creates a presumption for it depends in part on what type of statement is
being vouched for. Suppose a proponent P vouches for both of these statements: "There is a red
apple on the window sill." "Horatio placed the red apple on the window sill to show his love for
Ophelia." Intuitively, there is an air of controversiality or at least questionability about the second
statement which does not apply to the first. We are inclined to ask for evidence for the second
statement, but not for the first. I believe we can explain why this is the case, and that part of the
explanation consists in pointing out that the first statement is a description while the second is an
interpretation. But this brings us to the issue of what types of statements are there and how we
distinguish them. The field of rhetoric known as stasis theory addresses these issues. However,
different rhetoricians give different typologies of statements, and proposed criteria for distinguishing
types of statements involve serious philosophical difficulties. Building on the work of Sproule,
Fahnestock and Secor, and Kruger, we shall present a specific typology of statements. In
particular, we shall distinguish descriptions, interpretations, evaluations, and necessary statements as
the basic types of statement. We shall also give accounts of the distinguishing features of each type.
In doing this, we shall be giving a philosophical explication of these distinctions from stasis theory.
We shall conclude by showing how this account of the various types of statements fits into an
overall account of premise acceptability.
***
Consider the following two statements:
1. There is a red apple on the window sill.
2. The red apple on the window sill means that Horatio loves Ophelia.
Statement (1) seems a straightforward assertion of fact. We can just see whether it is true or false. It does not
seem to be the sort of statement one would argue for. By the same token, therefore, it would seem perfectly
appropriate to take (1) as a premise, indeed a basic, undefended premise, in an argument, should that advance
the case for the conclusion one is trying to show. (1), unless it were plainly false, would be an acceptable
premise. By contrast, there is a distinct air of controversiality about (2). How do we know that the public
occurrence of the red apple on the window sill is a sign of a certain private, mental disposition on the part of
Horatio? It may be true. There may be good evidence for it. But we want to have that evidence. It would not
ordinarily, then, be appropriate to take (2) as a basic, undefended premise in an argument. Without this further
evidence, the premise would not be acceptable.
(1) and (2) are paradigm examples of what the rhetorician J. Michael Sproule classifies as descriptions and
interpretations respectively. The branch of rhetoric known as stasis theory is concerned with the categorization of
statements. This raises a very intriguing question. If (1), a description, appears to be a straightforwardly
acceptable premise while (2), an interpretation, does not, is there some connection between their being a
description or interpretation on the one hand and their acceptability or unacceptability as premises on the other?
That is, can stasis theory advance the problem of premise acceptability, an open problem in the area of informal
logic and argumentation theory? Will recognizing the category to which a statement belongs advance our
understanding, at least in part, of whether the statement is acceptable? I believe this is the case and shall sketch
the connection between stasis theory and premise acceptability at the end of this paper. But to do this, we need
to have our categorization scheme for statements in front of us. That, in turn, means that we have identified at
least the basic categories of statements and have a defensible rationale for distinguishing those categories. That is
the main subject of this paper.
It is not hard to understand why rhetoricians would have an interest in classifying statements. If we are concerned
with effectiveness or persuasiveness in argumentation, an obvious first step would be to ask what are the types of
statements one would have to argue for. Different types of statements may call for different argumentative
strategies. Perhaps we simply do not argue for certain types of statements. As Fahnestock and Secor point out,
we do not argue about matters of taste. J. Michael Sproule offers a threefold classification of statements in
Argument: Language and Its Influence.1 Sproule distinguishes descriptions, interpretations, and evaluations.
Sproule understands a description as a claim involving an issue of fact, an issue concerning "the existence or
objective correctness of something."2 We might expect to get virtually universal agreement on an issue of fact
from all rational judges.3 Further, claims of fact are open to independent verification, being framed in
observational language.4 A fact, then,
must meet each of the following three tests: (1) It must be something that can be independently
verified; (2) it must be capable of being "mapped" (i.e. precisely described); and (3) it must be
something that can win the agreement of all reasonable persons.5
Interpretations for Sproule raise primarily issues of definition. He elaborates this by saying that interpretations
place facts into categories, relate facts, place them in perspective. We may say that they give facts a meaning,
where we understand giving meaning as relating something to a wider whole. In an evaluation, the principle issue
a value of some sort. What is right or wrong, good or bad, preferable or not preferable, praiseworthy or
blameworthy, virtuous or vicious?
In A Rhetoric of Argument, Jeanne Fahnestock and Marie Secor present a related classification of statements.
They begin by identifying two types of issues they claim we do not argue about-matters of fact and matters of
taste. Rather, there are four basic questions arguments may address:
(1) What is it? 
(2) How did it get that way? 
(3) Is it good or bad? 
(4) What should we do about it?
These questions then generate a typology of statements.
How does this typology relate to the tripartite scheme we have just considered? Matters of fact obviously
correspond to descriptions. Fahnestock and Secor characterize a fact as "a statement that can be verified,"6 and
modes of verification are public procedures. Furthermore, once there is agreement on verification procedure,
rational persons will accept the outcome as determining whether or not a statement describes a fact. Does the
claim that we do not argue about matters of fact mean that we need not include a category of descriptions in our
classification scheme for statements? Not at all. First of all, even if we do not argue for facts, we certainly argue
from them in defending further claims. Fahnestock and Secor are trying to develop a classification scheme for
arguable statements, those that could become the subject of controversy and so become conclusions in
arguments, rather than for all statements. Since we are concerned here with premise acceptability, their regarding
descriptions as not arguable statements is still compatible with regarding descriptions as a legitimate, distinct type
of statement. But we can question Fahnestock and Secor's claim that we do not argue for descriptions. Suppose
someone were accused of a crime. Then certain purely factual issues would be crucial to establishing guilt. The
prosecution might expend great effort marshalling evidence to establish these facts, to verify them. But wouldn't
this be to argue for those facts?
Answers to the question "What is it?" are categorical propositions in the sense that a subject is related to a
predicate. Although arguments for such claims may have distinctive procedures, the examples which Fahnestock
and Secor all give seem to fall under one or the other of the description/ interpretation/evaluation categories.
They cite such statements as "That cat is grey," a clear description, "That cat is a nuisance." a clear evaluation,
and "Representative government is time-consuming," an interpretation, as all instances of categorical
propositions. It does not appear that any of their examples cannot be included in Sproule's tripartite
classification, although some may be examples of mixed statements. "Man is a beast to man" seems to be both an
interpretation and an evaluation. We see no reason to count categorical propositions as an additional fourth type
of statement. "How did it get that way?" are causal statements. Sproule counts causal claims as one type of
interpretation. So these statements are again already accounted for on our description/interpretation/evaluation
scheme. To say that we should perform some action or follow some policy is to evaluate that action or policy
positively. To be sure, the questions "Is it good or bad?" and "What should we do about it?" are distinct, different
questions. Arguing for a claim that something is good or bad might proceed rather differently from arguing for a
claim that we should follow some course of action. As Fahnestock and Secor point out, to argue that something
is good or bad we should proceed either to measure it against some criterion of goodness or to show that it has
good or bad consequences.7 To argue for a policy statement or proposal, we should show that some current
situation or some aspect of a current situation is a problem in need of change or improvement, advance our
proposal, and then show how it remediates the problem. The procedure for supporting proposals, then, may
very well incorporate the procedure for showing evaluations proper. If our goal is to examine what makes for
persuasively effective argument, the goal for rhetoricians, it makes a great deal of sense then to separate
proposals from evaluations. But if our purpose is to distinguish types of statements with a view to understanding
whether and how they constitute acceptable basic premises, that we should distinguish evaluations from
proposals is not at all clear. To say that you should or must perform some action or avoid some action is surely
to say that your doing that action is preferable to your not doing it or vice versa. It is to evaluate it. So answers
to the policy question are a subclass of evaluations and thus also accommodated on our tripartite scheme.
In "The Nature of Controversial Statements," Arthur N. Kruger explicitly considers the issue of classifying
arguable statements. According to Kruger, the early Latin rhetoricians in effect accepted the
description/interpretation/evaluation distinction. One could dispute about whether a thing is-a question of fact,
what it is-a question of definition, or what kind it is-a question of evaluative category. Is an action justified or
unjustified, a proposed goal good or bad?8 Modern textbooks retain descriptions and evaluations, but drop
interpretations for policy claims, according to Kruger.9 He is dissatisfied with these schemes, at least with current
schemes. He complains that they leave many gaps, in particular ignoring the distinction between empirical and
analytic statements.10
In developing his own scheme, Kruger begins with that very distinction of definitional or analytic from factual or
empirical statements. Not every analytic statement is self-evident for Kruger, however, for he counts analytically
false or self-contradictory statements as analytic. For Kruger, statements are analytic just in case "analyzing their
form or meaning enables us to tell if they are true or false."11 Turning to non-analytic statements, Kruger
identifies two broad subtypes, factual and evaluative. He characterizes factual statements by giving examples of
some representative types. These include descriptions, comprising not only perceptually verifiable claims, but
ascriptions of personality traits and power vis-a-vis governmental office. Factual statements also comprise
correlations, claims that one condition is followed by or connected with another, causal explanations, and
predictions. Evaluative statements may have a number of uses, including expressing approval or disapproval of
something as a means to some end, asserting that some person or thing satisfies or fails to satisfy certain
normative criteria, or judging the merits of some policy. For Kruger, policy statements are evaluations, although
he is willing to allow them a separate heading in an overall classification of controversial statements.
These considerations suggest that we should adopt, at least as a working hypothesis, a fourfold classification of
statements: to descriptions, interpretations, evaluations we should add the class of analytic statements. However,
it would be better if we spoke of necessary as opposed to analytic statements. Where do mathematical
statements fall in our classification? Although some philosophers have regarded mathematical statements as
analytic, there are decisive objections to this view. Frege believed that all of mathematics could be reduced to
logic, whose principles are analytic. But when Frege presented his reduction of mathematics to logic, it was to
higher-order logic that he would make his reduction. This is obvious from his comprehension axiom which
quantifies over properties:
("F)($x)("y) [y Î x º Fy]
Since, as is widely known, this comprehension axiom leads directly to Russell's paradox, Frege's project was not
successful. Much work in modern mathematics has been devoted to reducing mathematics to set theory,
variously axiomatized to avoid the paradoxes. Is set theory logic? Quine in Philosophy of Logic points out a
significant feature of set theory which differentiates it from logic. "As soon as we admit `' as a genuine predicate,
and classes as values of quantifiable variables, we are embarked on a substantive mathematical theory."12 Set
theory, then, does not appear to be analytic, and it is to set theory that the rest of mathematics is reduced. But
surely many of the propositions of mathematics intuitively have the necessity of such obviously analytic
propositions as the basic truth-functional tautologies or such clear semantic truths as "All bachelors are
unmarried." Hence, we shall adopt as our basic scheme of categories for statements the fourfold classification
into descriptions, interpretations, evaluations, and necessary statements.
Broadly logical necessity is a philosophically and logically central concept. When in alethic modal logic we assert
a statement of the form `NA,' we understand that it is broadly logical necessity which is being ascribed here.
Semantically, we understand the concept as truth in all possible worlds. Identifying whether or not a statement is
necessary in this sense is straightforward in many circumstances. Surely it is a basic freshman exercise to
recognize tautologies as logically necessary statements in contrast to claims about current states of affairs, which
are contingent. So to recognize a class of necessary statements seems unproblematic.
Likewise, to recognize a class of evaluations seems straightforward. Since an evaluation categorizes something as
good or bad, better or worse, preferable or avoidable, right or wrong, praiseworthy or blameworthy, obligatory,
advisable, permissible, forbidden, in some sense or to some degree, we can tell by inspection that a statement is
an evaluation. In The Nature of Human Values, Milton Rokeach characterizes a value as "an enduring belief
that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to an opposite or
converse mode of conduct or end-state of existence."13 An evaluation is a statement which expresses such a
belief. Thus
1. It was good for me to be afflicted.-Psalm 119:71a (NIV) 
2. It is better to be Socrates unsatisfied than a pig satisfied.-J.S. Mill 
3. You should repay that debt. 
4. Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice and moderation is no virtue.-Sen. Barry Goldwater
all present evaluations and in each case this is immediate from the statement itself. Again many words, especially
those which are emotionally charged in some way, serve to express value judgments. Thus, William Buckley's
assertion that
5. The released draft of the Roman Catholic bishops' pastoral letter on the American economy is "a
document of striking intellectual slovenliness."
is clearly an evaluation-a very negative one.
In maintaining this fourfold classification, we are following Sproule rather than Kruger, who apparently combined
descriptions and interpretations into one class of factual statements. We believe it is very important to distinguish
between descriptions and evaluations, but we admit that this classification and how it has been made is
problematic. Philosophically it would be unfortunate to take making statements of fact as the defining condition of
descriptions. First of all, this categorization seems too broad. Couldn't we say of any expression which asserts
the truth, i.e. of any true statement, that it asserts a fact? If I want to say that a statement S is true, can't I say "It
is a fact that S"? Is it wrong to say
It is a fact that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer.
That stealing, except in very exceptional circumstances, is wrong is a fact?
If interpretations and evaluations are classes of statements distinct from descriptions, and descriptions concern
issues of fact, then the above two statements are incorrect, or at best anomalous or misleading. For
Smoking causes lung cancer
is an interpretation, while
Stealing, except in very exceptional circumstances, is wrong
is an evaluation. But this just shows up the inadequacy of the characterization, for surely these statements are not
anomalous or misleading. If descriptions be issues of fact, what is to prevent us from characterizing any true
statement, or any statement about which we feel distinctly confident, as a description?
There is another side to this coin of defining descriptions as statements of fact; one which has dangerous
suggestions philosophically. For if descriptions concern facts, are they the only type of statement which can be
true or false? If interpretations and evaluations are not descriptions then, this suggests that interpretations and
evaluations are not factual, i.e. not the sort of statements to be true or false. But since interpretations include
causal judgments and evaluations moral judgments, this would suggest that neither of such judgments are true or
false-a highly controversial claim which should not be prejudiced by a matter of terminology. If interpretations,
evaluations are neither true nor false, are they mere expressions of opinion, taste, or emotion? Is the issue of
rational agreement out of place here? What these considerations show is that we should regard the
characterization of descriptions as statements drawing issues of fact as only a heuristic or programmatic
suggestion. To develop an adequate characterization of descriptions, we must go further. Let us begin by looking
at some examples of statements which appear intuitively, but straightforwardly to be descriptions.
1. A bus is passing my office window. 
2. The house across the street is painted white. 
3. Caesar crossed the Rubicon. 
4. During the second week of January, 30 homeless persons were found dead on the streets of
New York. 
5. Fifty percent of the voters said they disapproved of the president's job performance. 
6. All the subjects in the experiment displayed cold symptoms.
7. All swans are white.
We have a variety of statements here, illustrating the various types of descriptions. Reports concern particular
events or conditions. (1) and (3) make reports of events, either present or past, while (2) reports a condition. (4)
and (5) present summaries of reports, while (6) and (7) are accidental universal generalizations. We say that
these universal generalizations are accidental because there is no nomic ascription here. These generalizations
merely assert constant conjunctions; whatever satisfies the antecedent clause also satisfies the consequent, and
this is a matter of contingent fact. They do not express a stronger or in some sense necessary connection
between antecedent and consequent, in particular they do not underlie or support subjunctive or contrary-to-fact
conditionals. Unlike "Objects when dropped above the surface of the earth always fall at an accelerating rate,"
which supports "If that object were dropped, it would fall at an accelerating rate," (6) does not support that "If
John were a subject in the experiment, then he would develop cold symptoms." Universal generalizations which
do support subjunctive or contrary-to-fact conditionals are nomic universals.14 But the accidental, non-nomic
character of these universal generalizations is the clue to identifying the hallmark of descriptions.
What all these statements have in common is that they are both contingent and their truth conditions are
extensional. That is, in specifying the conditions under which these statements would be true, we would not make
any reference to other possible worlds, as we would for modalized statements. This should be clear from the fact
that all the predicates appearing in these examples are observational. Whether or not they apply is something we
can tell by observation of states of affairs in this world. I propose that we take these two conditions-truth
conditional extensionality and contingency-as the defining conditions of descriptions. Atomic descriptions then
make extensional ascriptions of properties or relations to substantives. We may form truth-functional compounds
of such atomic descriptions, and we may form statistical or quantificational statements from extensional
predicates. All of these statements will be descriptions.
 
What are Interpretations?
If descriptions are contingent and extensional, are interpretations contingent and intensional? This would define
the class of interpretations too broadly, for many evaluative statements, in particular those involving the deontic
modalities "it ought to be the case that" and "it is permissible that" are both contingent statements (i.e. not broadly
logically necessary) and intensional in the sense that their truth conditions can be investigated through an
intensional semantics of possible worlds. But statements such as
It ought to be the case that all children are vaccinated.
It is permissible to cast an absentee ballot.
are evaluations, not interpretations. Interpretations are intimately related to one type or family of modalized
statements, however, that of subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals, statements of the form
If it were the case that A, then it would be the case that B.
Notice that subjunctive conditionals are not logically necessary, yet they are intensional statements, witness the
various systems of possible world semantics that have been put forward for them. Many interpretations support
subjunctive conditionals in the sense that if the interpretation is true, then some subjunctive conditional is true and
the intensionality of the interpretation can be understood through this support. To see this, consider three primary
classes of interpretations: causal statements, attributions of significance, and comparisons or what might be more
precisely called attributions of relevant significance.15
Causal Statements
Causal statements are paradigm examples of interpretations. To ascribe a causal connection, either by asserting a
general causal law, that one type of event is causally connected with another, or that specific events are linked as
cause and effect, is to incorporate events or conditions, or types of events or conditions, into wider wholes.
Consider
1. Heating water to 100C causes it to boil. 
2. Smoking causes lung cancer.
3. Abolishing the death penalty has raised the homicide rate. 
4. The impact caused the windshield to shatter. 
5. The patients' fever caused their pallor.
Whatever "causality" may mean or whatever types of causality one might distinguish, none of these statements
assert mere matter of fact conjunctions. To assert that one type of event or practice causes events or conditions
of some further type, or that particular events or conditions cause further events or conditions, as statements (1)-
(5) all do, is to connect these events or types of events together in a causal nexus, a larger whole. In particular, to
say that A causes B indicates that B is not a surd. It did not just happen but had a causal antecedent to which it is
nomically connected and thus related, in the light of which it is intelligible-at least to some degree.
We may count as causal statements not only those which assert some causal connection between certain events
or conditions, but those which indicate the strength or importance of causal factors. Thus
6. Nicotine is the prime factor in producing the health risks associated with cigarette smoking.
7. The paper out of which cigarettes are made plays a negligible role in adversely affecting health.
Especially with examples (1)-(5), it is straightforward to see that causal statements support subjunctive or
counterfactual conditionals. Indeed, causal statements are paradigm examples of laws of nature and a hallmark of
a law of nature is supporting subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals.
1'. If a body of water were heated to 100C, then the water would boil.
2'. If one were to smoke, then one's chances of developing lung cancer would increase.
3'. If one were to abolish the death penalty in a given jurisdiction, then the homicide rate in that
jurisdiction would increase.
4'. If a windshield were subjected to similar forces, it would likewise shatter. 
5'. If persons were suffering from the same fever, they would likewise be pale.
It is also basically straightforward to see how (6) supports a subjunctive conditional:
6'. If one were to expose a population just to nicotine in the amounts to which smokers are
generally exposed, then that population would display more health problems than populations
exposed just to some other health inhibiting factor in cigarette smoke.
Statement (7), however, is in effect a negative rather than a positive causal assertion. It tells us that paper used in
making cigarettes does not have a causal role in adversely affecting public health. But surely if positive causal
statements are interpretations, so are their negations. Indeed, more generally we should want to allow that claims
that an event occurred at random or that certain events happened by chance are also interpretations. These in
effect are denials of causation. They are claims that certain events were not caused.
Allowing that the negations of interpretations are themselves interpretations requires refining our assertion that
interpretations support counterfactuals. A claim that a particular event E happened at random or by chance does
not support a claim that if certain antecedent circumstances AC were to occur, then E would happen. Notice that
it does not even support the `might' counterfactual 16 that if certain antecedent circumstances AC were to occur,
E might not happen. An event might happen at random in some circumstances but not in others. There might be
lawlike connections between E and certain antecedent circumstances, in particular between E and AC. To be
more precise, then, we should say that it is positive interpretations which support counterfactuals. Again, does
the claim that E happened at random relate E to some wider whole or context? It actually denies that E is so
related, at least to a causal context or nexus. But to make this denial, that statement has to employ, at least
implicitly, concepts predicating such relatedness. For this reason, it is still appropriate to count the claim of
chance or randomness as an interpretation. We take it that these refinements do not undercut our main
characterization of interpretations, motivated by positive examples.
 
Attributions of Significance
As Walton points out in Argument Structure: A Pragmatic Theory, where there is an established causal
connection between A and B, instances of B may be taken as signs of A. Specific, overt statements that A
signifies B or that A means B are paradigmatic examples of interpretations.
1. That those two surfaces are both so hot is a sign that they have been just now rubbed together. 
2. The smoke coming from the chimney means that the plant is operating again.
But attributions of significance may assert actions to be signs of their motivations and not just external events to
be signs of their causal antecedents.
3. By directing a missile over Norwegian and Finnish air space, the Russians are trying to send the
United States a signal. 
4. If the recent election told us anything it is that most Americans don't want any sharing of wealth
with the poor.-Carl T. Rowan, November 18, 1984
To say that one event is a sign of some further event, process, intention is to assert that there is some nomic
connection between the two, but not to assert the nature of that connection. The sign need not be the effect or
result of what is signified. Sign and thing signified could both be effects of some one cause, and so tied together in
some causal nexus, although one does not cause the other, as in (5) and (6).
5. Frozen water in the gutter means the thermometer will read below 32F. 
6. A temperature over 104 means the patient's life is in danger.
Although saying that one event is a sign of some further event, process, intention is not asserting the nature of that
connection between the two, it is asserting nomic connection. These statements support subjunctive or contrary
to fact conditionals.
1'. If two surfaces were to be both similarly hot, then both might have been rubbed together.
It is straightforward to construct the associated subjunctive conditionals for each of (2)-(6) and to see in each
case that the truth of the attribution of significance supports the truth of the subjunctive conditional. It is also
obvious that by making an attribution of significance, the sign is related to some wider whole which renders it
more meaningful or intelligible. The signs are invested with a significance-they are seen to have a meaning, or are
claimed to have a meaning, beyond themselves.
 
Assertions of Relevant Similarity
Should someone argue
The method I propose worked last year (and this problem is similar to the one we had last year), so
it will work again.17
one is presuming not only that the problem this year shares one or more attributes with last year's problem (in
which case the assertion of similarity might very well be a description, if the attributes were extensional), but that
these attributes are nomically connected with successfully resolving some problem. What is presumed supports
the subjunctive conditional:
If a situation were to share these factors, then the proposed solution would be effective.
Hence, at least some comparisons are interpretations under our understanding of the concept. Developing this
point further is beyond the scope of this paper.18
We thus see that at least three central types of interpretations discussed by rhetoricians-causal statements,
attributions of significance, and comparisons in the sense of assertions of relevant similarity-can be seen as
intentional statements in that they are structurally related to subjunctive conditionals. We may identify a number of
other types of interpretations, such as dispositional statements, legal statements, ascriptions of responsibility,
ascriptions of interpretive necessity and possibility, statements of alternatives or disjunctions or dilemmas. In each
case, we can see how positive instances of such statements support subjunctive conditionals or how the
subjunctive conditional itself may be used to express such statements.
Classification of Statements and Premise Acceptability
We remarked at the beginning of this paper that descriptions seemed straightforward while interpretations
involved an air of controversiality. We thus suggested that our classification scheme for statements was relevant
to the issue of premise acceptability. We can now develop why. Consider descriptions. We have said that they
are contingent, extensional statements. Setting aside issues of testimony or taking someone else's word, how
would we come to believe a contingent, extensional statement? What cognitive mechanism would generate a
belief expressible by such a statement? Clearly, the issue would concern whether the belief concerned an event
or object in the external world or an internal event or occurrence such as a toothache. In the former case, our
belief would be the result of perception; in the latter, of introspection. But there is a presumption in favor of
perception. Until or unless we have evidence that our perceptual belief-generating mechanism is not functioning
properly, we may presume that it is and there is thus also a presumption in favor of the beliefs it generates. Our
description that there is a red apple on the window sill is straightforward because as a perceptual belief there is a
presumption for it. The presumption is even stronger for our introspective beliefs, for we are directly aware of
our internal states. We are directly aware of the pain we feel and the claim that we are currently experiencing a
toothache should be beyond doubt, for us at least.
Necessary statements are the province of the reason, which is the belief-generating mechanism here. But are not
such beliefs, truths of reason, either immediately self-evident or subject to necessary demonstration? Again, not
only is there a presumption for reason as a belief-generating mechanism, when the deliverances of reason are
manifestly self-evident it seems this presumption cannot be undercut. Again, the issue of statement classification
has proved relevant to the issue of acceptability.
Contrast these two cases with evaluations. Since evaluations are frequently the subject of dispute, it would seem
that there is an air of controversiality about such claims. But how are evaluative beliefs generated? This is a
sizable question which we believe involves examining different types of value, intrinsic, deontic, aretaic
separately. However, we can here note this telling point: If someone had no capacity for feeling, would that
person be able to form value judgments? If one quite literally felt no attraction to pleasure, virtue, knowledge or
repulsion towards pain, vice, or wanton ignorance could that person have any values? We do not understand
how and thus argue that feeling is intimately connected to the mechanism or mechanisms generating evaluative
beliefs. But is there a presumption for feeling? That is not among the faculties which are generally regarded as
having presumptions. Again, consider interpretations, in particular causal statements. We may come to believe
some causal claims through an intuitive apprehension of some connection between events or their attributes. Such
an intuitive apprehension should lead us to regard the apprehended connection as an hypothesis, subject to test.
But this is significant. There is not a presumption for intuition by itself. At best there is a presumption for intuited
beliefs that have been subjected to test. But such beliefs are not basic. If confirmed, we have the results of the
tests to justify them, to constitute premises from which to argue for them. So recognizing that a belief is an
interpretation is quite relevant to recognizing whether or not it is acceptable as a basic premise. There is not a
presumption for the mechanism which generated it and thus our sense that there was an air of controversiality
about interpretations seems well placed. The issue of statement classification then is quite relevant to the issue of
premise acceptability.
We have thus given a philosophical explication of certain distinctions from stasis theory. We have explicated how
we may distinguish descriptions, interpretations, evaluations, and necessary statements. We have also sketched
how recognizing that a statement is a member of one of these classes is relevant to deciding whether it is an
acceptable basic premise. The rhetorical issue of stasis theory then is connected with one of the central issues in
the theory of argumentation. When we evaluate an argument, at least from the logical point of view, we want to
know whether the premises are acceptable and whether they are adequately connected to the conclusion. Do
they constitute grounds relevant to the conclusion and sufficient for accepting it? Does the argument suffice to
transfer the presumption for the premises to the conclusion? This presupposes that there is a presumption for the
premises. To determine that issue, or at least to be able to explain why there is a presumption, we may do well to
point out what types of statements constitute the premises.
 
Notes
1. It is on the basis of Sproule's discussion that we incorporated this distinction into both editions of our
Thinking Logically. 
2. Sproule, [1980], p. 18. 
3. Sproule, [1980], p. 18. 
4. Sproule, [1980], p. 18. 
5. Sproule, [1980], p. 70. 
6. Fahnestock and Secor, [1982], p. 9. 
7. Fahnestock and Secor, [1982], pp. 209-10. 
8. Kruger, [1975], p. 137. 
9. Kruger, [1975], pp. 137-38. 
10. Kruger, [1975], p. 138. 
11. Kruger, [1975], p. 156, n6. 
12. Quine, [1970], p. 72. 
13. Rokeach, [1968], p. 5, quoted in Sproule, [1980], p. 184. 
14. For further discussion of the distinction between accidental and nomic universals and its implications for
identifying laws of nature, see Ernest Nagel, [1961], pp. 49-52. We are heavily indebted to Nagel's discussion
here. 
15. We hope that the parallelism between these three classes of interpretations and van Eemeren and
Grootendorst's three basic argumentation schemes-symp-tomatic, analogous, and causal is apparent. We might
think of these interpretations as warrants or as associated conditionals of the inference rules for arguments
instancing these three argumentation schemes. (See [1992], pp. 94-102.) 
16. Compare Lewis, [1973], p. 2, for a contrast of `would' and `might' counterfactuals. 
17. Example in van Eemeren and Grootendorst, [1992], p. 97. 
18. But we wish to point out that Sproule specifically considers comparisons as one type of interpretation
([1980], 146-51), and Fahnestock and Secor also discuss this type of statement ([1982], pp. 99-112). 
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